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Getting to Truth Before It Falls into
the Hands of the Lawyers: Pursuing
Accuracy in Criminal Cases

envisioned when it began to emphasize 75 years
ago that defense counsel at trial was essential to
getting at the truth.' And the place, they thought,
where truth was to be found was trial where it was
James B. Zagel'
judge and jury, after hearing prosecution and
Societies have always wrestled with the overall defense, not prosecutor, who decided the outcome.
question of the reliability of witnesses and, even now, This reliance on defense counsel to help us get to
when the legal rules are mostly settled, we still worry the truth was a key element in the first cases in which
about perjury, mistakes, delusions and the integrity of the Supreme Court sought to bring constitutional
memory. At issue today is the relatively small subset of regulation to eyewitness identification.'
But defenders are not duty bound to see that the
the witness problem-just that one moment when the
witness points to one person and says that is the per- truth comes out. Ifthe client is guilty they are obliged
son whose conduct I have described. For most witnesses to crime, the phrase "That's the man" is shortest part of the story they offer. Concern about its accuracy has been with us for centuries.
If solutions were easily found, this would not be
an age old concern. Be wary of those who, with
great confidence, offer the miracle cure to a problem
we all recognize. The results of the Illinois doubleblind eyewitness pilot program offer a vivid example
of why what some think obvious is often not so.
There is another point here; failure teaches as much
or more than does success and we ought not to
turn our back on any enterprise that seeks to make
our investigations and adjudications better. The great
value of tests, like the one we discuss herein, is they
keep us from a terrible kind of optimism that, once
disappointed, can lead us to abandoning the search
for something better.
What Is It We Are Trying To Repair and

Why?
Our world of arrest, prosecution and defense has
changed. The idea that truth arises out of trial in an
adversary system is still with us but mostly in theory
not practice. Plea bargains are the dominant mode.

My colleague, Judge Lynch in New York, has
accurately described the process this way:
"[T]he prosecutor ... is the central adjudicator
of facts ... arbiter of ... legal issues and of the
appropriate sentence to be imposed. Potential
defenses are presented by the defendant ... to a
prosecutor, who assesses their factual accuracy and
then decides the charge of which the defendant

should be adjudged guilty..."'
This is a far cry from what the Supreme Court
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It is critical to establish an identification before the eyewitness is subject to outside suggestion and a fhise identification is made. A false identification often has ireversable
consequences.

to use all legally permissible means to see that the
truth does not come out. This became particularly
clear when we thought about what a lawyer should
do at a lineup. Suppose the client tells his lawyer
"Yeah, I stole the stuff but I'm sure no one saw me
inside." Then the lawyer sees his client in a proposed
line-up of seven, six of whom are Hispanic, and his
client is the only blond white man in the group. Does
(Zagel, continued on page 18)
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(Zagel, continuedfrom page 17)
counsel want a fairer or more accurate lineup, one
more likely to elicit the truth? If he gets one and the
identification is made, he has deprived his client of
a good argument at trial. What if the police ask the
lawyer for suggestions to improve the lineup and
agree that they will follow these suggestions? Does
the lawyer improve the process to the detriment of
his client? The dilemma here is stark because, unlike
interrogation, the lawyer can not simply advise his
client not to participate in the lineup. The
identification procedure is going to happen. The
lawyer is not authorized to decide simply that it is
right to have a fair identification parade; the lawyer
is only authorized to seek the kind of parade that is
good for the client.
Many eventually accepted this state of affairs
where, in a trial, getting to the truth was not the
single overriding value.' I think they did so for two
reasons. First, the thought was that, in nearly all
cases, the truth came out anyway. Second, there
were important social values found in procedural
fairness and in giving the defendant a meaningful role
in his or her defense. The price of an occasional
criminal going free was thought to be worth paying
to achieve these good things. This tradeoff has
always been controversial. It might not survive a
public referendum.
The tradeoff also rests on premises that
professionals find hard to accept. It is not easy to
find scholars (though not so hard to find judges)
who actually believed that trial was really a good
way to get at the truth in hard cases; the scholarly
defense of the system was based upon its service
to other democratic values. And even where the
adversarial system could work, it was dependent
on having a skilled, adequately funded advocate on
both sides of the case. This last condition was often
unmet.
In the decades that followed the criminal
procedure upheavals of the 1960s, there was a
lukewarm to cool acceptance of the way criminal
cases were handled: lukewarm to cool because we
were in the midst of a rise in crime that lasted for
decades and, only relatively recently, subsided;
accepted because there was much in popular media,
Summer 2006
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shows like NYPD Blue and Law and Order, that
portrayed a system that got the right result. The right
result is the common result, but it is not because of
our system of trials. It is because, in most cases,
there is no serious question of guilt. The evidence is
usually more than good enough and, if it isn't, the
prosecutors frequently won't take a chance on the
case. Perfection is unattainable, but getting it right
in the largest percentage of cases is not good enough
even if that percentage is in the high nineties. The
consequences of error are too grave.
But still we toddled along with what we had. The
volume of criminal cases, which was associated with
the rise in crime and the relatively poorly funded
defense services, led to fewer trials and what Judge
Lynch called an administrative system of criminal
justice. We would be that way today but for recent
events.
The public, as opposed to the defenders of the
world, was generally worried only about the guilty
going free. New science and today's news made
them worry, at least a little, about the innocent being
found guilty.
For this reason the importance of finding the truth
about guilt is valued more highly today than it has
been in many years. We might be in the midst of a
tectonic shift in perspective about crime,
investigation and the accused.
Some of this might seem strange to say to the
public. Haven't we always thought that the end of
the criminal justice system was to find out the truth?
Most people did, but no one who labors in this field
believes that truth is always revealed or acted upon.
There are unjustified convictions and unjustified
acquittals. Even under the better practices that we
will someday have, we will never reach perfection
because the truth is elusive, often beyond the ability
of humans to discover. But we won't stop
prosecuting. Crime has a devastating effect on its
victims and a large effect on the society in which
we live. We have never decided to leave the guilty
or the innocent to the judgment of heaven. We ought
then to do the best we can to lock up all the guilty
and free all the innocent, knowing that we will
sometimes fail.
(Zagel, continued on page 19)
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What Has Led Us to Try Now?
The short answer to this question is that there is no
sudden change, just a gaudy tipping point. The shift to
concern for truth has been building for a while.
Start with Mirandav. Arizona6 and the de-emphasis on admissions of guilt. Mirandacan now be
read as an implied endorsement of the reliability of
eyewitnesses and, perhaps, of the very forensic evidence that is now under attack, say, bite marks, and
even of reliable evidence excludible under the Fourth
Amendment. The Court understood it was holding that
even voluntary confessions, whose truth value was unquestioned, were to be excluded from evidence. This
de-emphasis of truth and re-emphasis on procedural
protections did not last very long. The Supreme Court
limited the scope of Miranda.'The Court (in an opinion written by Justice Thurgood Marshall) also decided to permit the police to use deception to induce
confessions' and narrowed the scope of the exclusionary rules based on the Fourth Amendment.9

'A-

The idea of science in law enforcement is relatively new.
Identification by fingerprinting, br example, was not broadly
accepted in the United States until the 1920s.

evidence because the law permitted anybody to offer
opinion evidence.
Fingerprints are a good example of the early evidence of experts. Fingerprints were used for identification in India in the 1850s.1 o Written work appeared
in 1881 and Galton's book was published in England
in 1892.11 By 1910, fingerprinting itself was in fairly
wide police use. 12 Despite this, it was not until 1911
that a reviewing court approved its use, but broad
acceptance did not come until the 1920s, and it was
not until the 1940s that courts said the prosecution
would no longer have to prove that no two fingerprints are alike.1 3 The course of admission of other
forms of identification evidence was similar. It took
time to get the courts to approve comparative micrography, microanalysis, questioned documents. Most
of the first scientific evidence dealt with traces and
marks which the jurors themselves could perceivefriction ridges, striations on bullets and so forth. As the
twentieth century went on, and science itselfbegan to
deal with things not directly observable, the law began
to take in serology, general chemistry and neutron activation analysis. In all these cases, though, one reason
the courts moved slowly was the resistance of defense counsel to the admission of such evidence because it rarely served any purpose other than to incriminate their clients.
DNA evidence was accepted with amazing speed
precisely because it could exonerate as well as incriminate. There were very few to fight tooth and nail against
its admissibility because the prosecutor or defender
who objected vigorously to DNA evidence knew that,
in the next case, they might be offering that same evidence. DNA, too, came to the courts at a time when
standards of what constituted reliable and valid science had become clearer. DNA analysis had the advantage of service as a tool in many sciences, not merely
criminalistics. The broader use ofDNA analysis meant
the discipline had been critically reviewed by many
more scientists than, say, fingerprints.
It is true that the advent of closerjudicial scrutiny
of expert witnesses in recent years1 4 has called into
question much ofthe science that is offered in the courtroom, but the outcome of disputes about questioned
document examination, serology, fiber analysis,

Despite this renewed endorsement of the value of
confessions, there is no doubt that the Supreme Court,
and every sane person for that matter, would prefer
that guilt be determined by incontestable evidence like
that found three times every week in New York, Miami and Las Vegas by an infallible corps of Crime Scene
Investigators. It is science that created that gaudy tipping point.
The entry of science into the courtroom started at
a very slow pace. Most of the earliest expert testimony from doctors and alienists was admitted into (Zagel, continuedon page 20)
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(maybe, even fingerprints) are not for today's discussion. DNA survived its first tests and it proved that
there were a small, but nonetheless very meaningful,
number ofwrongful convictions. DNA science teaches
there is, in a certain class of cases, a class of evidence
that, if properly handled, is conclusive. Of course,
properly handled is not inevitable, but it put forth an
implicit message. We can get to the truth better than
we had gotten to it before. And this is why pilot programs are undertaken: not because eyewitnesses can
become the legal equivalent ofrecombinant strands of
DNA, but because DNA showed that we can do better. Obviously only if we try to do better.
There will be attention paid to the causes ofwrongful
convictions, now the predominant element is bad eyewitness identifications. So too, we will look at error
rates in particular kinds of cases." These studies might
help us in our scrutiny of past errors.
Professional investigators of crime have known for
hundreds of years that evidence can lead to the wrong
person, that some eyewitness identifications are worthless, that some confessions are worthless and that some
forensic analyses are worthless. From the perspective
of the police and prosecutors, the solution was either
not to charge in those cases or to drop the charges if
already brought. The defense often proposed this solution. The problem was handled in house and there
was always the final safeguard of the trial.
What DNA told the public is that a trial does not
protect adequately against these errors if the prosecutor decides to go forward with the case. DNA put an
enormous dent into the idea that the adversary system
is the best way to protect against false convictions.
The belief that even good faith errors made earlier in
the process will be detected and repaired as the case
moved through our adversary system has lost some of
its hold on our society. While the adversary system
might serve many social values apart from its detecting the truth of accusations, all these values collectively seem no longer to outweigh the risk of that the
judgments it produces may be untrustworthy. It is not
that these values are to be disregarded, it is the degree
to which they are fostered that is questioned. When a
crime victim sees the perpetrator unjustly acquitted, it
is small consolation to tell them that it is better that ten

2006
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guilty men go free than one innocent man be convicted,
but the society as a whole accepts, or at least understands, this policy. Now the message is, not only do
we let those ten guilty go free by the way, we also
send quite a few innocent men to prison too. That
message is not well received.
So the turn now is to making things right before the
lawyers in the adversary system get their hands on it.
What Can We Expect from Science?
Science proceeds by evaluating ideas, theories,
guesses, conjectures, hopes and dreams. It does this
by experiments of all sorts and observations.
The idea that there is science in law enforcement is
not so old. Early criminology was a form of moral philosophy as in Cesare Beccaria.' 6 One of its first scientists was an anthropologist Cesare Lombroso,17 who
died less than one hundred years ago. Many of his
theses seem laughable today but he used the inductive
method of science as well as he could. Our understanding of criminology is still very much in flux. We
seem to know that more police officers and more
people in prisons are good at reducing crime rates.
Some ofthe standard explanations about strong economies, too many people under thirty, order maintenance
policing, strong gun laws, capital punishment, changing drug habits and markets all remain unproved." But
we are not talking about criminology here, it is
criminalistics or police science which largely concerns
itself with helping to find out, by examination ofphysical objects, who did what, when and how.
In recent times, I have noted, some accepted police science has come under question. This is not
unique to police science. The scientific enterprise is
filled with failure and mistakes. There is a well-known
maxim offered to some first-year medical students
which runs this way: "half ofwhat we teach you will be
wrong, we just don't know which half."
Mistakes in science are not limited to earlier centuries like the phlogistan theory of fire. The theory is a
laughing stock today but it was clever in its time. The
inventor believed there was a combustible substancephlogistan-consumed by combustion which required
air. After the phlogistan was gone the residue weighed
less than the original product as is demonstrated by
the case of ashes which weigh less than the burnt log.
(Zagel, continued on page 32)
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Recent expernents have std ed and compared eyewitness
identification procedures including thc use of moving video
versus photographs, culprit-absent lineups versus culpritpresent lineups, and foil selection by culprit description
versus selection by suspect resemblance.

How can psychological science enhance
the effectiveness of identification
procedures?
An international comparison.
Tim Valentine, Stephen Darling and Amina
Memon'
The sequential double-blind method protects
the guilty, moving video images protect the
innocent (a little), but foil selection strategy

makes no difference.
The reliability of eyewitness identification has
attracted concern from the legal profession in England
for at least 100 years. In 1904 a committee of enquiry
was established to investigate the trials ofAdolf Beck.
Incredibly, on two separate occasions Adolf Beck was
wrongly convicted on the basis of mistaken eyewitness
identification. In both trials, multiple eyewitnesses
identified Beck as a confidence trickster who stole
jewellery from them. The crimes were subsequently
found to have been committed by William Wyatt. The
1904 Committee of enquiry led directly to the
establishment of a Court ofAppeal 2

Devlin report led directly to a landmark judgement in
the English Court of Appeal, which established a
requirement thatin cases ofdisputed identification the
trial judge must caution the jury about the dangers of
eyewitness identification evidence. The judge should
point out that confident eyewitnesses may be mistaken
and instruct the jury to consider carefully the
circumstances of the identification.4
From this historical perspective, it is unsurprising
to learn that mistaken eyewitness identification is also
a major problem for the United States courts.
Nevertheless, the extent of the problem has proved to
be greater than many may have anticipated. The work
of the U.S. Innocence Project, which to date has led

to 183 prisoners being exonerated by new DNA
evidence, found that mistaken eyewitness identification
was a factor contributing to three-quarters ofthe original
wrongful convictions.'
Recent developments to eyewitness identification
procedures
Eyewitness identification procedures used in the
United States and the United Kingdom have some
important differences. In the United States, live lineups
and identification from arrays ofphotographs are both
frequently used to collect formal eyewitness
identification. Traditionally, in the United Kingdom all
formal eyewitness identification evidence has been
obtained from live lineups. Identification from arrays
of photographs has never been permitted as a formal
means of identification. Over the last few years video
has replaced almost all live lineups. This innovation
has been made possible by development of
sophisticated computer systems used to compile video
lineups from a standardised database of moving video
clips.
Recently identification procedures in the United
States have been the subject of consultation with
eyewitness researchers. Identification from arrays of
photographs is still widely used, but the U.S. National
Institute of Justice set up a Technical Working Party
for Eyewitness Evidence to review procedure and
produced a guide to best practice.

Concern about further wrongful convictions based
on mistaken identification led to a government enquiry
into the reliability ofeyewitness identification evidence,

(Valentine, continued on page 22)

chaired by Lord Devlin, which reported in 1976.1 The
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Recent developments to identification
procedures in the USA
The U. S. National Institute of Justice document
Eyewitness identification:A guidefor law
enforcement ("the Guide")6 includes the following
guidance:
* The foils in a lineup should be selected to
generally match the witness' description
of the culprit.
* There should be a minimum of five foils.
* The witness should be advised that the
culprit may or may not be in the lineup.
* The witness should state in their own
words how confident they are of any
identification.
Two methods of lineup presentation are endorsed
by the Guide: 1) a simultaneous lineup, in which the
witness is permitted to inspect all of the photographs
or lineup members before making an identification and
2) a sequentiallineup, in which the witness sees one
photograph or person at a time and makes a decision
prior to viewing any other photograph or person. The
guide does not express any preference for one method
over the other. The procedures mentioned here do
not form an exhaustive list ofthe provisions in the Guide.
It should be noted that the guidance is a
recommendation of best practice and has no direct
legal force.
In an earlier 'white paper,' written under the
auspices of the American Psychology - Law Society
("AP-LS"), psychologists had advocated that the
person who administers a lineup should not know
which person in the lineup is the police suspect. That
is to say that the administrator should be 'blind' to the
identity of the suspect. This procedure is known as
'double-blind' as neither the administrator nor the
witness has prior knowledge of who the suspect is in
the lineup. This measure was strongly advocated by
researchers because it removes all possibility of the
witness being influenced by the lineup administrator.
Such influence can be very subtle and may occur
without any intention or awareness of either the
administrator or the witness. The double-blind
procedure is well established as an important aspect
of scientific enquiry. For example, neither the patient
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nor the clinical staff should know which patients
received a placebo in a drug trial. A recommendation
of the double-blind method is conspicuously absent
from recommended best practice in the Guide on
eyewitness identification.
Research based on identification from photograph
arrays suggests that mistaken identification can be
reduced by sequential presentation ofthe photographs
as outlined in the Guide.9 However, the Guide did not
include the important stipulation of a 'sequential
double-blind method.' Under sequential presentation
instructions the witness should make a decision after
viewing each photograph as to whether he or she is
the culprit. If the witness rejects the photograph they
are shown the next photograph. The procedure stops
when the witness makes an identification. The method
endorsed by researchers crucially stipulates that the
witness should not know how many photographs are
in the lineup, the witness is given unbiased instructions
(e.g., that the person they saw may or may not be in
the lineup) and, importantly, that the administrator is
blind to the identity of the suspect.1 0

Video identification has a number of

important benefits [including]. . . dramatically reduc[ing] the delay before an
identification can be organized, . . . usu-

ally produc[ing] a video lineup within two
hours of request,

...

[has] a large data-

base of video clips from which to select
foils, . . . and [employs] a laptop which
can be taken to a witness who is unable
to attend the police station.

Sequential presentation is believed to reduce
mistaken identification by reducing the opportunity for
the witness to make a relative judgement. In the
traditional simultaneous presentation, a witness who
believes that the culprit is in the lineup may identify the
person who most looks like the person they saw,
having had the opportunity to view all the photographs
in an array. Sequential presentation aims to prevent
relative judgements by forcing the witness to make
(Valentine, continued on page 23)
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independent judgements to each lineup member.
Sequential presentation has been adopted in some
jurisdictions in the United States. However, in some
cases the strict procedure advocated by researchers
has not been followed in all of its aspects. It is worth
noting that researchers did not include sequential
presentation amongst the recommendations ofthe APLS white paper."
Recent developments to identification
procedures in England & Wales
The Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984
("PACE") which applies in England and Wales (but
not in Scotland or Northern Ireland), includes a code
of practice for identification by eyewitnesses ("code
D"). The code can be revised without the need for
new primary legislation. In recent years the code has
been revised on an annual basis. The current code of
practice (2005)12 includes the following provisions:
* A lineup that includes one suspect must
consist of at least eight foils.
* The foils must resemble the suspect in age,
general appearance and position in life.
* The suspect has the right for their legal
representative to be present during the
identification procedure.
* The person who administers the lineup
cannot be involved in the investigation of
the case (but note that the administrator
does know who the suspect is).
* Witnesses must be advised that the person
they saw may or may not be present.
* Witnesses must be advised that if they
cannot make a positive identification they
should say so.
* Witnesses must view each member of the
lineup twice before making any
identification.
* Video identification should be used unless
there is a reason why a live identification
is more appropriate.
Although the code of practice does not have
statutory force, trial judges have the discretion to
exclude or allow eyewitness identification evidence.

Therefore police forces have systems in place to
demonstrate compliance with the code.
Two different IT systems are in widespread use in
British police forces to provide video identification.
VIPERTM (Video Identification Procedure Electronic
Recording) and PROMAF" (Profile Matching)." The
systems produce similar formats of video lineup, but
each has its own database of images. Lineups consist
of 15 second clips of each person shown one after
another. The sequence starts with a head and shoulders
shot of the person looking directly at the camera, who
slowly turns their head to present a full right profile to
the camera. The person then slowly rotates their head
to present a full left profile to the camera. Finally the
person returns to looking directly into the camera in a
full-face pose.
Research on video identification
Research has demonstrated that VIPER video
lineups from real criminal cases were fairer to the
suspects than conventional 'live' lineups,14 and that
VIPER video lineups were equally fair to white
European and African-Caribbean suspects.I In these
studies, participants (known as 'mock witnesses') were
shown a set of videos of VIPER lineups or a set of
photographs of live lineups held as part of the
investigation of the case. For each lineup they were
given the first description of the offender made by the
original witness. The mock witnesses were required
to choose, on the basis of the witness' description, the
lineup member who they think is most likely to be the
police suspect. Therefore, a 'mock witness' simulates
a witness who (a) has no memory of the culprit at the
time ofthe identification procedure; (b) can remember
the description they previously gave to the police and
(c) nevertheless, makes an identification from the lineup.
If the lineup is perfectly fair, and all members fit the
description, the mock witness would have no basis on
which to make their selection and would merely have
to guess who is the suspect. Therefore, if a large
number of the mock witnesses are asked to make a
selection they would select the suspect on 11 percent
of occasions (1 in 9) from each lineup, because the
lineups all contained a suspect and eight foils.

I (Valentine, continuedon page 24)
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Using this procedure 25 percent of mock witnesses
(1 in 4) chose the suspect in the live lineups, more
than expected by chance (25 percent vs. 11 percent).' 6
In comparison, 15 percent of mock witnesses selected
the suspect from the videos of VIPER lineups.1 7
Statistical analysis showed that the VIPER lineups
were significantly fairer than the live parades (15
percent vs. 25 percent), and the VIPER lineups were
not significantly less fair than expected by chance (15
percemt vs. 11 percent).'"
Previous data from real cases suggested that live
lineups may be less fair to ethnic minorities than to
white Europeans. Therefore, the fairness of VIPER
lineups ofAfrican-Caribbeans and ofwhite Europeans
was compared. The VIPER parades were found to
be equally fair to suspects of both ethnic groups.19
Benefits of video identifications
Video identification has a number of important
benefits compared to live lineups. First, use of video
can dramatically reduce the delay before an
identification can be organized. Live lineups have been
subject to long delays to enable a selection of
appropriate foils to be available to stand on a lineup
(typically ofone to three months).2 0 In contrast, VIPER
can usually produce a video lineup within two hours
of request. Second, approximately 50 percent of live
lineups in England and Wales were cancelled, for
example, due to failure of a bailed suspect to attend,
failure of the witness to attend or lack of suitable
volunteers. 2' Cancellations contribute to a further
increase in delay before the witness can view a lineup.
Since the introduction of video identification, the
proportion ofprocedures cancelled has fallen to around
five percent.2 2 Third, availability of a large database
of video clips from which to select foils (approxiamtely
12,000) makes lineups fairer to the suspect. Fourth,
use ofvideo is less threatening to victims, who no longer
have to attend an identification suite where their
attacker may be physically present. A further
advantage is that a laptop can be taken to a witness
who is unable to attend the police station. In a recent
high-profile case, Abigail Witchalls, a victim of an
attack who was left paralysed, was able to view a
video lineup from her hospital bed, and a suspect was
eliminated from the enquiry as a result.

2006
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Can psychological science improve the
effectiveness of video identification?
An empirical investigation was recently conducted
in our laboratory to investigate whether the
effectiveness ofthe British video identification procedure
could be enhanced by adopting: (a) a sequential
double-blind procedure and (b) selecting foils that
match the witness description of the culprit rather than
foils who resemble the suspect. The impact of using
moving rather than still video images was also
investigated. Substantial laboratory experiments
designed to simulate a forensically relevant situation as
closely as possible are described.
Sequential double-blind presentation
Video identification naturally yields a sequential
presentation. Research based on identification from
photograph arrays suggests that sequential presentation
can reduce mistaken identifications when the witness
is required to make a decision after viewing each person
as to whether he or she is the culprit. However, the
current PACE code of practice does not allow any
advantage of sequential presentation to be realised
because it requires witnesses to view the entire lineup
twice before making any decision.23 Thus, the question
arises ofwhether video identification procedures could
be improved by allowing the sequential double-blind
instructions to be used.
We compared the outcomes of lineups when
participant witnesses viewed a video lineup conducted
under sequential double-blind instructions to the
outcomes when following the procedures currently used
by the police.2 4 Although the lineup administrator in
police lineups is not blind to the identity of the suspect,
for consistency all lineups in our experiments were
conducted double-blind. All of the lineups were
constructed under supervision of the police using the
VIPER national database of foils. A video clip of the
actors who played the role of a thief in our experiment
were recorded at VIPER-equipped police stations
under standardised conditions, following the same
procedure as used with police suspects. Approximately
200 students were recruited in small groups to take
part in a study on mood and health. During the
procedure the witnesses viewed an unexpected staged
theft of a laptop. They gave a written description of
(Valentine, continued on page 25)

Public Interest Law Reporter 24

Public Interest Law Reporter |124
8

Zagel: Getting to Truth Before It Falls Into the Hands of the Lawyers: P

SYMPOSIUM ISSUE
(Valentine, continuedfrom page 24)
Figure 1

Figure 1: The outcome of culprit present video lineups run under the existing 'view the lineup twice' instruction and the sequential method. All lineup were administered double-blind. Statistically there were significantly more correct identifications of a guilty suspect made under the view twice instructions (p<.05).
culprit present video lineups compared to the existing
procedure (36 percent vs. 65 percent of witnesses,
see Figure 1). There were also fewer mistaken
identifications of foils from culprit absent lineups (23
percent to 10 percent), but the latter effect was not
statistically significant (Figure 2). The sequential
instructions appear to reduce the rate of choosing, and
therefore suppress correct identifications as well as
incorrect identifications.
Sequential double-blind viewing instructions are
believed to reduce the number of mistaken
identifications by making it difficult for witnesses to
make a relative judgement. In our experiment we asked
the witnesses whether they had compared the faces of
lineup members with each other or whether they had
considered each person one at a time. 93 percent of
witnesses who viewed a culprit present lineup answered
'one at a time', regardless ofthe viewing instructions
they had been given. The naturally sequential
presentation of a video lineup may make relative
judgements very difficult even under the existing
procedure. When these data for the culprit absent
lineups are considered the proportion of witnesses
identification. They could ask to see the video clips of answering 'one at a time' dropped to 80 percent under
any of the lineup members again prior to make an both lineup instructions. Thus, the presence of the
culprit influenced the strategy witnesses used but the
identification.
Under sequential double-blind instructions there sequential double-blind instructions did not.
were significantly fewer correct identifications from (Valentine, continued on page 26)
the culprit. Participants returned after approximately
seven days to view a video lineup. Half of the
participants saw a lineup that included the culprit, half
saw a lineup which included an innocent suspect. The
foils in the lineups were always the same people. The
experimenter, who could not see the faces on the video
screen, did not know whether the culprit was in the
lineup. All witnesses were advised that the person they
saw may or may not be present in the lineup, and that
if they could not make a positive identification they
should say so. Under the sequential double-blind
instructions, witnesses saw the video ofthe first lineup
member. They were asked if he was the culprit, or if
they would like to see the clip again. If the witness
identified the lineup member as the culprit the procedure
ended. If they rejected the line member they were
shown the next clip. The witness was told that once
they had proceeded to the next lineup member they
could not change their mind or go back to view a
previous image. They were not told how many people
were in the lineup. In the control condition, following
the existing code ofpractice, witnesses were instructed
to watch the entire lineup twice before making any
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Figure 2

Figure 2: The outcome of culprit absent video lineups run under the existing 'view the lineup
twice' instruction and the sequential method. All lineups were administered double-blind. There were
no statistically significant differences between the outcomes.
Recent research clearly shows that there is a the same for 15-second moving video clips and for
reduction in the number of correct identifications of static full-face images presented on a monitor for 15
offenders under sequential double-blind instructions. seconds (Figure 3). When the culprit was not in the
In 2001, a combined analysis of 23 studies reported lineup, there were significantly fewer mistaken
this effect.25 The Illinois Pilot Program, an evaluation identifications of foils from moving clips than from still

of the sequential double-blind produce in real cases
conducted by the Chicago Police, found the same
effect. 26 We have also found a reduction in correct
identifications in a laboratory study under realistic
conditions using video lineups constructed from the
police national database of foils under police
supervision. Although sequential double-blind
presentation may provide some modest protection to
innocent suspects, it did not show a reliable effect in
our laboratory.
Moving images compared with stills
As part of the same experiment we have also
investigated whether the moving images used in video
identification contribute to its success compared to
single full-face images, as frequently used in American
photograph lineups. Intuition suggests that witnesses
may be more likely to be able to identify a culprit from
a moving video sequence that allows the face to be
seen from a variety of angles. However, results from
the live staged-incident experiment using video lineups
showed that this was not the case. The rate of correct
identification from culprit present video lineups was
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images (Figure 4). Thus the use of moving video clips
improves the fairness of lineups without affecting the
sensitivity ofthe procedure. The same trend was found
in a subsequent experiment, but the difference in
mistaken identifications from culprit absent lineups
between moving and still images was not statistically
significant. When data was combined from an
experimental condition which was common to both
experiments, based on the existing identification
procedure (i.e. viewing all lineup members twice), the
advantage for moving images in culprit absent lineups
was still significant. In conclusion, use ofmoving images
may offer some protection to innocent suspects, but
the size of any effect is small.
Research comparing selection of foils by culprit
description and by suspect resemblance
The aim of a further experiment was to investigate
whether video identifications could be made more
reliable by using a culprit-description strategy, rather
than a suspect-resemblance strategy to select the foils."
(Valentine, continuedon page 35)
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with higher rates of filler choices. This pattern remains
constant across those lineups known to contain only a
single suspect.
We recorded a total of 257 high confidence
identifications (including all suspect structures and
relationship categories). Of these 186 were suspect
choices, 64 were no choices, and seven were filler
choices. Thus, the rate of known errors for high
confidence choices was 7/257 or 2.7 percent When
looking solely at those single-suspect lineups containing
identifications of strangers, it is of some interest to note
that there was only one known error (filler choice) out
ofa total of65 high confidence identifications regardless
oflineup type and procedure. Out of 81 high confidence
stranger identifications (for both single and multiplesuspect lineups), there was also only one filler choice.
Ifwitnesses were influenced by investigators in the
simultaneous and not the sequential/blind procedure,
then they should be more confident in their choices,
on average, in the simultaneous than the sequential
procedure. When we examined the percentage of
highly confident witnesses ("That's him. I'm certain.";
"100 percent sure."; "100 percent absolutely positive.";
"I'm positive that's the one that shot me."; "Yep, that's
him. I'm sure, 200 percent") for each lineup procedure,
78.3 percent and 77.1 percent were highly confident
in their choices and 7.8 percent and 9.8 percent
expressed low confidence ("I think that's him, but I
can't be positive.", ""He looks like the guy, but I'm
not positive.", "# could have been the passenger.",
"Only 45 percent sure.") in the simultaneous and
sequential lineup procedure, respectively. Thus,
contrary to the investigator influence explanation,
witnesses were not more confident in their choices
under the simultaneous than sequential lineup
procedure.

We can test the investigator influence explanation
even more precisely by noting that if the administrator
was leaking cues to pick the suspect (and not the fillers)
during the simultaneous lineups, only those witnesses
that picked the suspect would have the consensual
validation of the their choices. Those who picked the
fillers would actually be disagreeing with the
administrator's influence attempt. This reasoning
predicts that the witnesses viewing the simultaneous
lineup (and who chose the suspect) should be more
confident in those choices than witnesses who chose
the suspect from a sequential lineup. In contrast, those
who chose the fillers from a simultaneous lineup should
be less confident than those who chose fillers from a
sequential lineup. We analyzed the percent ofwitnesses
who expressed high confidence for suspect choices
and witnesses who expressed high confidence for filler
choices. For simultaneous lineups, 69 out of 87 (or
79.3 percent of the) witnesses who chose the suspect
did so with high confidence. For sequential lineups,
118 out of 140 (or 84.3 percent of the) witnesses who
chose the suspect did so with high confidence. Thus,
if anything, contrary to the investigator bias explanation,
witnesses were more likely to be confident in their
suspect choices in sequential/blind lineups than in
simultaneous lineups.
When the filler choices were examined, 66.7 percent
of the filler choices made to simultaneous lineups and
21.5 percent made to sequential lineups were done so
with high confidence. While the Ns are small, the trend
is nonetheless opposite to the investigator influence
explanation for the results. Thus, those who chose a
filler from a simultaneous lineup were more confident
even though their choices should have disagreed with

(Ebbesen/Finklea, continuedonpage 28)

Table 3. Number and Percent of Suspect and Filler Choices as a Function of Racial Similarity of Witness/
Victim and Culprit forAll Lineups Containing Race Information
Rad al
Similarity
Other Race
Same Race
Total

Number of Choices
Suspect

126
303
429
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Percent of Choices

Fill er

13
is
31

No Choice
127
138
265

Suspect
47.37
66.01

Filler
4.86
3.92
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(Ebbesen/Finklea, continuedfrom page 27)
the influence attempts of the administrator (assuming
they existed).

multiple-suspect lineups.
As can be seen, the increase in suspect choice rates
from sequential to simultaneous lineups was not larger
when witnesses had presumed weaker memories for
other-race suspects (40.8 percent v. 52.9 percent)
than stronger memories for same-race suspects (59.9
percent v. 70.4 percent). In addition, the decrease in
filler choices was not larger for other-race fillers (7.2
percent v. 2.9 percent) than same-race fillers (7.9
percent v. 1.1 percent). In short, these results are
inconsistent with the investigator influence explanation.

iii) Investigator bias and cross-racial
identifications
General consensus among experts is that an ownrace bias exists such that witnesses are more accurate
in their selections from lineups of their own race than
in their selections from lineups containing individuals
of a different race.'" Consistent with this idea, results
from the Illinois Pilot Program" (Table 3) indicate the Addressing critics of the Illinois Pilot Program
probability that witness/victims chose a suspect
Some critics may argue that the results ofthe Illinois
increased when the suspect and witness were of the study are compromised by a confound between lineup
same race compared to when they were of different procedure and blind testing. That is, the sequential
races. However, the filler choice rates were unaffected. lineups were conducted by investigators blind to the
Thus, when witness/victims attempted to identify identity of the suspect in the lineup, whereas the
suspects who were in a different racial group than their investigators administering simultaneous lineups were
own, they were less likely to identify the suspect as not blind to the suspect's identity. These conditions,
the culprit and were no more likely to make a known however, were proposed as a package deal, meaning
error by identifying a filler. Another way to describe that the double-blind sequential lineup represents the
this result is that when confronted with an other-race policy as it would and should be instantiated over the
lineup, suspects were less likely to choose someone traditional lineup. Thus, in evaluating the proposed
as the perpetrator.
policy change, we compared the components of the
Examining the cross-racial data yields findings proposed change with the standing policy. Had the
inconsistent with the notion of stronger investigator bias effects of lineup procedure and blind testing been
in simultaneous lineups. Investigator bias should be evaluated independently, researchers would not be able
predictably stronger when memory for the culprit is to draw conclusions about the suggested policy change
weak. Research on the own-race bias would suggest as a whole. The Illinois Pilot Programl9 was not
that witnesses have weaker memory for culprits of designed to test the varying options of simultaneous/
another race than for culprits of their shared race. It blind, simultaneous/non-blind, sequential/blind and
would be hypothesized then, that effects of investigator sequential/non-blind. These four procedures would
bias would be more sizeable between simultaneous need to be evaluated separately for the most
and sequential lineups given cross-racial identifications comprehensive assessment. The primary conclusion
than would be seen in same-race simultaneous and researchers can make is that the sequential doublesequential identifications. Suspect choice rates in same- blind procedure, as tested in Illinois, is not superior to
and other-race simultaneous lineups were 188/267 traditional simultaneous lineups.
Previous field studies that promote the success of
(70.41 percent) and 74/140 (52.86 percent)
respectively, while filler choice rates were 3/267 (1.12 sequential double-blind lineups, such as that in
percent) and 4/140 (2.86 percent). These rates can Hennepin County, MN,2 0 have not included traditional
be compared to suspect choices in same- and other- simultaneous control groups to fully examine the
race sequential lineups at 115/192 (59.9 percent) and proposed policy change. Regardless, results of the
5 1/125 (40.8 percent) respectively, while filler choice Hennepin County program closely mirror those of the
rates were 15/192 (7.81 percent) and 9/125 (7.2 Illinois Pilot Program 21 with a 54 percent suspect
percent). Data is included from both single and identification rate and eight percent filler choice rate
(Ebbesen/Finklea, continued on page 29)
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for all known single-suspect, double-blind sequential
lineups. Had a control group been included, is it not
possible that they would have also seen a higher rate
of suspect identifications and lower rate offiller choices
in traditional single-suspect, simultaneous lineups? The
error on which researchers have clearly focused is that
of reducing false identifications, while omitting the
consequences of a witness failing to select the suspect.
With respect to any policy, the details must be
clearly articulated. Simply indicating that a sequential
lineup procedure is to be instituted is insufficient. There
are several procedural variations ofa sequential lineup,
which if altered and implemented in different
combinations, may dramatically affect any resulting
eyewitness decision. One such variation is the inclusion
of a stop rule, in which witnesses are told they will not
be allowed to view the remaining alternatives in the
lineup once they have made a positive identification.
If no stop rule is included (following the sequential
lineup procedure of the present study), an interesting
psychological phenomenon arises. Suppose a witness
positively identifies a foil in the lineup before the suspect
is shown. What do witnesses do when they then see
the suspect? Do they raise their decision criterion at
that point? Do they dismiss the suspect's photo
because now that they believe they have completed
the task of making a selection, are no longer paying
careful attention to the lineup? In other words, we
need to determine where witnesses set their decision
criterion for making a selection from the lineup and
whether this decision criterion is set differentially for
simultaneous and sequential lineup procedures.22
These issues beg the question regarding the decision
strategy witnesses use in their selections. One key
variable in this decision process is the witness' strength
of memory for the culprit. Also, a witness' ability to
discriminate between the actual culprit and innocent
foils may depend on: how similar innocent foils appear
to the culprit, how similar the culprit's looks in the
lineup are to his looks at the time of the crime, and
how similar an innocent suspect's looks in the lineup
are to the culprit's looks at the time of the crime. It is
also important to know what witnesses use as their
standard for determining this degree of match. When
witnesses are presented with items is sequence, rather
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than all at once, we raise the distinct possibility that
witnesses will use different decision criterion for
different items as they progress through the sequence.
One of the key problems with the nature of a
sequential protocol containing a stop rule is that it
prevents the witness from being able to choose the
best lineup member when there is more than one that
is above the witness's decision criterion for a good
match. Thus, in low similarity lineups where the witness'
ability to discriminate (between the suspect and foils)
is high, and the witness' criterion for choosing is high,
one would see a small difference in selection choices
using different decision strategies.23 Conversely, in high
similarity lineups, we might expect that one ofthe foils
presented before the suspect might be a "good enough"
match for the witness to pick him. However, were this
foil and the suspect presented side by side, the witness
might choose the suspect because the suspect is an
even better match to the witness' memory than is the
foil. One consequence of this is that more foils will be
chosen when the suspect is placed later in the lineup.

When witness/victims attempted to iden-

tify suspects who were in a different racial group than their own, they were less

likely to identify the suspects as the culprit and were no more likely to make a
known error by identifying a filler. Another way to describe this result is that
when confronted with an other-race
lineup, suspects were less likely to
choose someone as the perpetrator.
All foils that meet or exceed the witness' criterion for
making a positive identification will be chosen before
the witness even gets to see the suspect.
From the Illinois Pilot Program data,24 we were
able to examine differences in the rate of sequential
lineup fillers selected before and after the suspect
appeared in the lineup. Of the 21 sequential lineup foil
choices (compared to a total of six simultaneous lineup
foils chosen), 13 were selected by witnesses before
the witness had the opportunity to view the suspect in
the lineup, while eight were chosen after the suspect
(Ebbesen/Finklea, continuedonpage 30)
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lineup, they may withhold making a selection, believing
there are always more alternatives to be seen. If each
was viewed. Eliminating the pre-suspect foil choices alternative remains in view after it is presented,
in sequential lineups, the difference in filler choice rates witnesses may utilize these as comparisons to the
between the two lineup procedures is virtually current item upon which they are deciding. Another
eliminated. Interestingly, these results suggest that the possibility is to remove each item from view after a
higher rate of foil choices seen in sequential lineups yes/no decision has been made, forcing an absolute
may be driven by pre-suspect fillers that meet or exceed decision for each item. Also, allowing multiple passes
a witness's decision criterion for making a positive through a lineup may lead witnesses to withhold a
identification.
selection until all lineup members have been viewed
and compared to one another.
Future Research
Yes, the specifics of a particular protocol can easily
Evident from the current discussion, more be defined as to which procedure will be utilized.
laboratory and field research is needed to examine the However, research has not yet been conducted to
efficacy of varying methods of conducting eyewitness determine how all procedural variations of sequential
identification lineups. Sequential double-blind lineups lineups interact to produce different results, nor has it
do not appear to yield fewer known errors than been determined how foil choice rates and suspect
traditional simultaneous lineups. No single study can (guilty suspect vs. innocent suspect) choice rates are
yield definitive results or subsequent recommendations affected by these combinations. Further research is
that are to be widely applied.25 These findings should needed regarding the double-blind procedure and its
encourage more law enforcement agencies to conduct effects on accuracy as well. Options to be evaluated
further research to scientifically investigate the costs include witnesses making selections in private, in front
and benefits that would be associated with instituting a of a blind administrator, or on a computer screen. The
given policy change. As seen from the different pattern main argument for a double-blind procedure stems
of findings in Chicago and Evanston compared to those from the presumed possibility of investigators
in Joliet, any policy changes must be evaluated against inadvertently sending signals to witnesses, thus
jurisdictional differences in the outcome and perhaps influencing their selections.26 Perhaps, though, the mere
adjusted accordingly.
presence of an investigator (blind or not) may
Furthermore, procedural variants of sequential differentially affect witness selections. For this reason,
lineups should be clearly defined and examined before the recommended blinding procedure should be
any policy recommendations should be enacted, and evaluated with witnesses making their final selections
the same holds for details of the double-blind without any investigator contact. Alternatively, simply
procedure. In addition to the aforementioned option telling the witnesses that they should not assume that
of including a stop rule, sequential lineups can differ in the investigator knows who the suspect is might be
protocol based on several factors: what witnesses more than sufficient to produce whatever benefits
believe about the size of the lineup, what happens to researchers believe might be achieved with the more
lineup items after they are viewed, how many passes complex double-blind procedure.
When research is proposed to compare polices,
through the lineup a witness is given, and where in the
lineup the suspect is positioned. The specifics of the all recommendations for change should include methods
sequential procedure may play an important role in and measures that will allow one to monitor which
eyewitness accuracy. For example, providing procedure is more successful; before commencing
witnesses with information on the number ofaltematives research, the measures of success should be defined
in the lineup could create pressure for the eyewitness and agreed upon before any policy change is instituted.
to select someone before the end of the lineup is In the present domain, work that uses DNA, for
reached, or it may build expectations toward the end example, to establish the accuracy of suspect choices
of the lineup that the culprit is not present. Conversely, would avoid criticisms about the use of filler choices
if witnesses are not told how many faces are in the
(Ebbesen/Finklea, continued on page 44)
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enforcement purposes independent ofreliability issues.
Chicago, for example, has recently paid $15,000,000
to plaintiffs who proved that police "tipped" lineup
witnesses.' In all likelihood that award will generate a
legion ofsimilar suits-some justified, most unjustified,
but all expensive to defend. "Double-blind"
administration of lineups and arrays can allow the police
effectively to defend themselves against such claims: a
"double-blind" administrator can't tip anyone. Doubleblind techniques will also allow prosecutors to insulate
the investigators from similar defense attacks in criminal
trials.
There is a new zone of cooperation developing,
where mutual education occurs between the street,
the lab and the courtroom. This zone has been
increasingly utilized in the aftermath of the DNA
exoneration cases. Where practitioners have ventured
into this zone, in Boston, New Jersey and Minnesota,
for example, they have found the results to be
rewarding-to mark a place in which to generate
genuine improvements in practice. It presents novel
challenges, but it also promises significant rewards. It
was with those rewards (and those challenges) in mind
that we joined with our colleagues to form the John
Jay Center For Modem Forensic Practice, an effort
to build a model of a neutral, academic venue where
practitioners and scientists can meet to protect the
innocent and catch the guilty-to get, in the words of
Hennepin County District Attorney Amy Klobuchar,
"Stronger cases and more justice."
Still, there isn't much point in involving scientists in
these discussions unless we will allow them to "do
science"-to approach the empirical questions we
have identified with their proven, rigorous procedures.
The Illinois Legislature posed an empirical question,
and it ought have, but did not, receive an empirical
answer derived by accepted scientific practice. We
think that there are ways to apply the "objective
scientific methodologies" that the Illinois Legislature
wanted in the field. All ofus have a lot to learn both
from rigorous field studies and from the complementary
future laboratory studies that must answer questions
that the field studies are structurally unable to approach.
As a next step along the path we have sketched a
proposed protocol for future eyewitness field studies,
which is reproduced below. Like everything else in
31
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this new zone of cooperation our suggestion is up for

discussion.
We believe one particular aspect of the situation
deserves priority treatment-the advent of efficient,
reliable, convenient digital technology. Inevitably this
technology because of its convenience and flexibility
will soon begin to dominate eyewitness investigative
procedures. That looming fact provides a spur to
immediate further field studies, but it can also be a
very significant aid to conducting those field studies.
The capacity of new technologies to capture data and
facilitate a simple, witness-driven identification
encounter with a minimum of disruption in police
operations can help to unravel many of the practical
difficulties that led to the fatally confounded study
recounted in the Mecklenburg Report. The capacity
to simply standing on the far side of a laptop while the
witness makes choices and records his or her level of
confidence can allow the police to accomplish a great
deal in the way of preserving both scientific rigor and
investigative continuity.
One hundred years after Hugo Munsterberg first
upbraided the legal system about its misuse of
eyewitness memory,' we still have a lot to learn from
each other about the resolution of cases that turn on
eyewitness memory. The learning should be around
the conference table with everyone included, not in
the courtroom, or through the press release. Our hope
is that conference tables at academic institutions around
the country may provide the neutral ground where all
parties can engage the science to inform local practice.
One of the things we'd bring to the conference table is
the protocol that follows:

'James Doyle was a panelist for New Policies, New
Practices: Fresh Perspectives on Eyewitness
Identificationon April 21, 2006 at Loyola University
Chicago School of Law. He and his co-authors are from
the Center of for Modem Forensic Practice, John Jay
College of Criminal Justice at the City University of New
York.
2 See Report to the Legislature of the State of Illinois: The
Illinois Pilot Program on Sequential Double-Blind
Identification Procedures by Sheri H. Mecklenburg,
Program Director (Mar. 17, 2006) availableat
www.chicagopolice.org.
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